Language of Thought Hypothesis: Post #1

This is the first post in a larger series about the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH). In this post, I introduce the concept.

Jerry Fodor’s Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH), part of the philosophy of mind’s essential reading, is a groundbreaking, widely influential work that is one component of a small collection of tangential hypotheses initially put forth in Fodor’s book The Language of Thought (1975).

When taken together, this collection claims to explain the nature of rational thought within humans: namely, that thinking is inherently a computational function.

LOTH, in particular, proposes that mental representation has a linguistic structure and occurs as an innate, mental language called “Mentalese.” Fodor’s LOTH has had supporters and detractors since its inception. Indeed, various LOT (Language of Thought) proponents disagree with Fodor on specific tenets of his original LOTH (and its companion theories) and this has resulted in a plethora of LOT sub-doctrines and schools of thought over the years.

Additionally, important challenges to LOTH have been made by theorists who purport that the mind is more accurately modeled by connectionist networks and by those who believe that at least some mental representation occurs in formats other than sentential, like maps and images.

As Fodor’s LOTH is essentially deemed the “classic” LOT theory since its inception, this series of posts will highlight its major tenets, elucidate some of the major arguments for and against it, note where LOTH can coexist with its rivals, and offer new directions for cognitive scientists to explore.